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E-mail address: zulmajid@fkkksa.utm.my (Z.A. MIncident involving failures of 6 months old API 5L X42 (NPS8) and SDR 17, 125 mmmedium
density polyethylene pipe (MDPE) supplying natural gas to an industrial customer has
caused serious 7 h supply disruption. Study was performed to identify the most probable
cause of the pipes failures. The study conducted by reviewing the existing design and con-
struction data, visual physical inspection, pipe material analysis, structural analysis using
NASTRAN and Computational Fluid Dynamics analysis (CFD) using FLUENT. Investigations
revealed that high pressure water jet from leaked water pipe had completely mixed with
surrounding soil forming water soil slurry (high erosive properties) formed at a close vicin-
ity of these pipes. Continuous impaction of this slurry upon the API 5L X42 pipe surface had
caused losses of the pipe coating materials. Corrosion quickly ensued and material loss was
rapid because of the continuous erosion of oxidised material that occurred simultaneously.
This phenomenon explains the rapid thinning of the steel pipe body which later led to its
failure. Metallurgical study using photomicrograph shows that the morphology of the steel
material was consistent and did not show any evidence of internal corrosion or micro frac-
tures. The structural and CFD simulation results proved that the location, rate and the
extent of erosion failures on the pipe surfaces can be well predicted, as compared with
actual instances.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Cases involving failure of pipes carrying highly combustible fuel such as natural gas are rarely reported. High pressure
natural gas transmission pipeline (API 5L X60) in northern part Pakistan [1] and a T-shape natural gas pipeline network
(API 5L X52) near gas extraction plant in northern Mexico [2] are two examples of such cases. In both cases the material
degradation causes by corrosion is the main factor that contribute to the failure of the pipes. Another example of a similar
pipes but carrying liquid fuel that has failed are the 52 km 1600 (406.4 mm) pipe (API 5L X52) in Kuwait [3] and the API 5L X46
pipe in Brazil [4]. Delayed cracking and transverse cracking has been identiﬁed as a reason for the pipes to fail.
A case involving the failure of natural gas pipes adjacent to water is yet to be reported. A leak of high pressure water pipe
in a mixture of soil and sand can create an erosive slurry impact on nearby pipes. Slurry erosion will form by the interaction
of solid particles suspended in liquid and a surface which experience losses of mass by repeated impacts of particles [5]. This
type of erosion has been reported as the major source of failure of many engineering equipment such as slurry equipment
and hydraulic components [6–8].
This erosive slurry impactwill causemetal loss ormetal thinning and eventually lead to the pipe failure [5]. This event could
trigger much disastrous incident involving ﬁre and explosion which could cause loses in term of life and economics [9,10].. All rights reserved.
: +60 7 5545667.
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The location of the gas pipe leak was evident after the personnel from a gas utility company in northern part of Malaysia
observed the bubbling of the gas through the watery soil (Fig. 1). Prompt action was taken where the leakages were imme-
diately isolated through valves. A teamwas later sent to excavate the site at the incident area. This was carried out in order to
locate the exact source of the leakage, to rectify and repair the damaged pipes and to make a proper record of the failure or
damage for further investigation. Presented in this paper are ﬁndings, probable cause of failure and conclusions concerning
the failure of the pipes.
3. Methodology
Studies conducted were comprised of four fundamental aspects. First, the background information which caters in the
form of design and construction data that provide basic formation for understanding the sequence of events and operational
conditions that might have led to the failures of the pipes. This studied was later followed by physical inspection of speci-
men, recorded photos and subsequent observation of the actual failed pipes sections. This has been conducted in order to
locate the actual position and orientation of pipes and to reconstruct the event that lead to the failure. Next, the metallurgical
analysis of pipes was performed on the pipe section and its surrounding failure area, followed by ﬁnal study on the structural
and ﬂow propagation. The structural analysis will provide insight of the stress distribution in the vicinity of the failed pipe
section as thinning occurs. Therefore, the location and weakness area can be well predicted. The CFD analysis conducted
could provide simulation of graphical velocity and pressure proﬁle of the leakage and bursting analogy. It could also indicate
how it might have affected or lead towards the failure of the adjacent pipe/s.
4. Findings and discussion
4.1. Review of background information
Upon the discovery of the incident location area, it was evident that three pipes adjacent to each other; a 800 (203.2 mm)
steel NPS8 and a 125 mmMDPE natural gas pipes, and a 600 (152.4 mm) asbestos water pipe lying parallel to each other, with
all three indicating signs of damage or leak. An electrical cable lying parallel to the pipes with no apparent sign of damage
also presence in a close vicinity. The NPS8 and MDPE pipe was carrying natural gas at about 1800 kPa and 345 kPa pressure,
respectively, prior to shut down. The asbestos pipe was transporting water with an estimated ﬂowing pressure of 1000 kPa
(10 bar).
The failed NPS8 gas pipe was made of carbon steel manufactured with speciﬁcation of API 5L X42. It was buried 1.3 m
below the ground about 195 mm laterally from the underground water pipe. The water pipe was buried at a similar depth.
Slightly above it, at 1.2 m below the surface and at roughly the same distance between the steel pipe and the water pipe, is
the MDPE gas pipe (Fig. 2). The thickness of the NPS8, MDPE and asbestos pipe were 5.6 mm, 11.4 mm and 10 mm respec-
tively (see details in Table 1).
There were four possible reasons initially given as the possible root cause of the failures, which are:
i. Construction defect.
ii. Third party damage.Fig. 1. Surface water splashing due to gas pipe leakages.
Table 1
Physical parameters of pipes.
Parameters NPS8 gas pipe PE gas pipe Water pipe
Depth cover (m) 1.3 1.2 1.3
Material Carbon steel Polyethylene Asbestos
Internal diameter (mm) 203.2 102.2 152.4
External diameter (mm) 214.4 125.0 172.4
Thickness (mm) 5.6 11.4 10.0
Fluid pressure (KPa) 1800 345 1000
Fig. 2. Relative positions of API 5L X42, 6 in. asbestos and PE pipes.
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iv. Leaking water pipe impact.
It is made to understand that the pipeline was laid about six months prior to the incident. Standard construction proce-
dures that require proper coating, sound cathodic protection system and other pipeline integrity measures has been appro-
priately complied during construction and pipe laying process. This diminished the possibility of the construction defects.
On the possibility of third party works or acts, initial discussion with the gas utility company personnel and available
operational records dismissed that this had taken place. Furthermore, visual inspection did not ﬁnd any indication or evi-
dence to support this fact. To answer the third possibility, the metallurgical analysis was subsequently performed and will
be discussed details in the following section.
Visual inspections were carried out on both the photos and on the two physical pipe specimens provided (Fig. 3). When
received, the exposed part of the steel pipe (with the coatings eroded) is already heavily oxidized (Figs. 3a and 4a). Only
when the photo records were received, was the original condition of the exposed part, immediately after the incident, be-
came evident. It was found that the coating materials has been completely stripped was in fact clean, smooth and shiny
(Fig. 4b).
The pipes were later rearranged in the lab to reconstruct the positioning of each pipe relative to each other prior to the
failures. This was conducted based on the original information supplied. The repositioning of the pipes was important to help
us to build a better understanding on the direction of the leaks and how it might have impacted upon the adjacent pipes
(Fig. 5).
On the NPS8 carbon steel pipe section, a hole with an average diameter of 10 mm was discovered in the middle of the
eroded part of the pipe (Fig. 6). The eroded part was found to be smooth and free from the rust. The size of the eroded section
was around 50 cm by 30 cm (Fig. 4b). The absence of scratch marks or dents in the vicinity of the eroded part seem to support
the statements of site engineers that no third party work was being observed at the location of incident.
Our initial assessment suggests that the asbestos water pipe with 10 mm wall thickness was the ﬁrst to fail. The ﬂowing
water pressure in the pipe was reported to be around 1000 kPa (10 bar). The leak could have caused a high pressure water jet
which, with the presence of the surrounding soil and sand materials, could have produced highly abrasive slurry. This slurry
could have initially impacted upon the NPS8 causing the erosion of the coating materials followed by thinning of the steel
pipe body. After sufﬁcient pipe material was removed, the remaining pipe strength will no longer be able to withstand the
high internal pipe pressure. This eventually led to the steel pipe rupture and enlargement of leak section.
Fig. 3. Photos of two failed specimen.
Fig. 4. Surface condition of failed steel pipe.
Fig. 5. Reconstruction of relative original pipe positions.
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materials underneath the MDPE pipe causing it to move downwards. When the steel gas pipe leaked, more materials were
Fig. 6. 10 mm diameter of hole on API 5L X42 pipe.
822 Z.A. Majid et al. / Engineering Failure Analysis 17 (2010) 818–837displaced causing the MDPE pipe to drop even further until it was low enough to be ‘in the line of ﬁre’ from the high pressure
gas jet (Fig. 7).
The visual inspection of the photos of the incident and on the damaged pipe sections led to early conclusion that the
source of damage to polyethylene pipe (MDPE) is due to the high pressure impact of the gas jet which originates from
the carbon steel pipe (NPS8) leak. This is most evident from the ﬁnal location of the MDPE pipe relative to the NPS8 pipe
leak and the erosion pattern found on the MDPE pipe damaged area (Figs. 7 and 8). Thus the metallurgical and structural
analysis is only required for the NPS8 carbon steel pipe.4.2. Analysis on pipe’s failed section
Visual assessment of the position of the damaged part of PE pipe relative to the steel pipe leakage led us to conclude that
the PE pipe damage was directly caused by the impact of the high pressure (1800 kPa/18 bar) gas jet that gushed through.
Therefore, the metallurgical/physical analysis of the pipe failure was only conducted for the NPS8 pipe. Analyses of the steel
pipe failure include the following tasks:
i. Visual examination of steel gas pipe and photography.
ii. Dimensional mapping of the failed gas pipe.
iii. Metallographic analysis on the failed steel pipe using optical microscopy.4.2.1. Visual examinations
The carbon steel gas pipe was inspected externally and internally and photo-documented. The examination of the gas
pipe revealed the following facts:Fig. 7. In-situ PE pipe directly ‘in the line of ﬁre’ of the API 5L X42 gas jet.
Fig. 8. Repositioned of API 5L X42 and PE pipe in lab (after excavation) truly match with Fig. 7.
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ii. The side of gas pipe facing the water pipe and where the hole is located has lost its coating completely and exhibited a
clean and shiny surface as shown in Fig. 4b and Fig. 6a.
iii. No signiﬁcant scale or deposit was noted on the inside surface of the pipe indicating no internal corrosion.4.2.2. Dimensional mapping
Dimensional mapping was conducted on the two half circles, where the hole is located, about 50 mm apart as shown in
schematic diagram in Fig. 9. Results are illustrated in Fig. 10a–c for specimen A and specimen B, respectively. Results ob-
tained clearly showed that the thickness of the metal decreased substantially closer against the jetting oriﬁce position. In
other words, metal loss has occurred on the area facing directly to the water pipe oriﬁce jet resulting in a hole which in-
creased in its dimensional size with severed metal losses. This indicates that the hole was caused by drastic erosion probably
from the failed water pipe buried in the vicinity of the gas pipe.Fig. 9. Schematic of steel gas pipe showing procedures of dimensional mapping and specimen preparation.
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Mechanical and operating data of the pipeline are summarized in Table 2. The pipe had been strictly manufactured to
follow API 5L X42 requirement. The pipeline has been tested hydrostatically at the mill for 15100 kPa (151 bar) on August
3rd 2003. Table 3 shows the chemical composition of the pipe.
Microstructural examination of the gas pipe was undertaken to determine possibility of microstructural deﬁciencies of
the pipe at the failure region. If the results reveal consistency of microstructural arrangement at the failure region compared
with another section away from the failure (considered as the base metal), then it can be concluded that erosion is the main
cause of the pipe failure.
This task was carried out by microstructure examination of two specimens at location away from the leak hole (specimen
1) whilst another specimen was taken at the failure area (specimen 2) in the same plane shown in Fig. 10a and b. Prepared
specimens were then examined with 200X magniﬁcation using Nikon optical metallographic microscope.
Examination of the microstructure at the failure region and base metal location clearly indicate close similarity between
specimen 1 and specimen 2 that consists of the typical ferrite and pearlite structure observed in carbon steels. There is also
no evidence of any micro fractures. The microstructures are shown in Fig. 11a–d for respective specimen 1 and specimen 2.
These ﬁndings fully support earlier hypotheses that the pipe was failed due to the erosion of pipe surface instead of
corrosion.Fig. 10. Dimensional mapping of API 5L X42 gas pipe. (a) Results of dimensional mapping for section A – A (50 mm away from hole). (b) Results of
dimensional mapping for section B – B (half way through the hole). (c) Physical mapping at failure section B – B.
Fig. 10 (continued)
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Table 2
Mechanical and operating data of pipeline.
Grade of steel API 5L X42
42,000 psi min, yield
Type of pipe Seamless
Material Black carbon
Diameter 219.10 mm
Wall thickness 5.6 mm
Hydraulic pressure (factory tested) 15100 kPa
Table 3
Chemical composition (wt.%) of gas pipeline.
Sample
C Si Mn P S Cu Cr Ni Mo Ti Co B Ca Al
0.18 0.22 0.84 0.013 0.004 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.001 0.06 0.0001 0.00023 0.03
Fig. 11. Microstructures of the pipe taken from sample 1 (microstructure a) and sample 2 (microstructures b, c and d). There is no evidence of
microstructure changes.
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There are two possible scenarios that might take place, ﬁrst, the NPS8 ﬁrst to fail and cause the PE and water pipe to leak.
This possibility could occur if contributed by the third party damage, construction faulty or due to material defects but it
does not correlate with coating and material loss pattern.
Second scenario would be the water pipe ﬁrst to fail. Small crack could have allowed strong jetting effect. This heavy jet-
ting will mixed thoroughly with surrounding soil to produce corrosive slurry. This corrosive slurry erodes the coated pipe
causing the coating losses that probably lead to surface oxidation/corrosion. With continuous direct water/slurry jet impact
to the pipe could led to rapid pipe thinning, and ﬁnally pipe rupture. High pressure jetting from leaked water from the water
pipe had earlier caused signiﬁcant displacement of the supporting soil materials underneath the MDPE causing it to move
downwards to a maximum displacement of around 200 mm, where it was impacted by the high velocity/pressure gas jet
from NPS8 pipe.
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6.1. CFD simulation
In this particular study, the FLUENT software was used to simulate the sequence of processes that might have taken place
which led to the failure of the gas pipes. Results obtained from simulations reinforce the hypothesis made earlier, that the
steel pipe leak was caused by the impaction of erosive soil water slurry from water pipe. As for the MDPE pipe, damages was
then caused by the high pressure gas jet from the leak of the 1800 kPa (18 bar) NPS8steel pipe. Simulation conducted had
ability to obtain pressure and velocity proﬁles surrounding impinged MDPE pipe. The information on how the gas jet ﬂows
from steel pipe behaved within the region is essential to strengthen the determination of the whole case study. Values ob-
tained would assist structural simulation to model relevant boundary condition. In this particular study, two dimensional
CFD analyses had been conducted.
The outlet is assumed to be exactly tangent to the steel pipe. Due to high velocity gas jetting with homogeneous resis-
tance domain, jetting direction is expected to be in similar planner, thus two dimensional (2D) analyses is considered
sufﬁcient.
The pre-processing included physical modeling, setting-up appropriate boundary condition and construction of the com-
putational mesh. Around 50,000 computational nodes (Fig. 12) were built and found to be sufﬁcient in resolving computa-
tional domains. Boundary conditions that relate to geometric entities set up for this particular work are shown in Table 4.
In the water jet simulation, the operating pressure was set consistently 10 bars (1000 kPa). Gas jet ﬂow is strictly re-
strained, since the primary intention of this part of the simulation is to obtain the ﬂow behavior and its relevant ﬂow proﬁle
effects to the steel pipe structure.
In simulating natural gas jetting, the system operation has been classiﬁed as compressible ﬂow type. Hence, heat energy
coupled with ﬂow energy model was used. In order to simplify the modeling process, only steady condition was applied.
Under the steady condition, it was assumed that computational domain is fully immersed in homogeneous water distribu-
tion. Slurry effect (water + soil) was not modeled due to lack of information on the soil physical characteristics.
The properties of water and methane were incorporated in the modeling. Methane which makes up more than 90% of the
natural gas composition is assumed to be representative of the natural gas properties. Gravitational effect must be included
since the movements of water within the region are highly dependent to its body relative force. Water ﬂow was not being
considered at this particular stage. This is due to nearly equilibrium region (nearly saturated) was reached between the do-
main which is ﬂooded with water.Fig. 12. Computational mesh for water jet and natural gas jet.
Table 4
List of boundary conditions.
Boundary type Boundary conditions
Steel pipe jet Asbestos pipe jet
Pressure inlet Gas inlet (18 bar) Water inlet (10 bar)
Pressure outlet Ambient (0 bar) Ambient (0 bar)
Wall Pipe wall (adiabatic) Pipe wall (adiabatic)
Symmetry Left, right, bottom bound Left, right, bottom bound
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to high gas jet impingement from the steel pipe rupture. Due to the high gas jet pressure of NPS8 pipe, the MDPE was ex-
pected to experience immediate failure. The failure of the MDPE pipe should not affect other pipes. Jet ﬂow produced by the
MDPE pipe section is considered weak due to its large failure outlet (Figs. 3b and 8).6.1.1. Simulation hypotheses and assumptions
Through analysis of the case has enabled us to produce several hypotheses, prior to execute the ﬂow simulation:
i. As the water pipe made of asbestos material, its brittle characteristic would cause the pipe to fail instantly. There will
be no signiﬁcant physical outlook left on the failed edge region. However, it was noticed from the photo taken from the
site showing the upper part of the asbestos pipe seems experienced more failure than the lower part.
ii. The photo in Figs. 2, 5, 13 and 14 seemed to support the hypothesis that the water jet direction was around 20 from
the horizontal axis. The 20 of jet ﬂow direction was determined through ideal geometrical approached by assuming
the jet ﬂow direction was normal to the surface of the outlet (normal impaction). Exact initialization and condition of
the asbestos pipe failure cannot be determined due to unavailability of asbestos water pipe specimen.
iii. MDPE pipe vertical position tends to be lowered (moving downward) due to lack of tangential support.
iv. As the mediumwas moving due to the jet ﬂow from water pipe and steel pipe, MDPE pipe began to drop due the grav-
itational force and subsequent soil weight that vertically act on the MDPE pipe section (Fig. 15).
v. Asbestos water pipe and natural gas steel pipe were assumed not being displaced due to their physical stiffness.
vi. Once the MDPE pipe began to displace, in-equilibrium force acting on the PE pipe will occur.
vii. Expected operating strength of the MDPE pipe will reduce.
viii. From the existing design speciﬁcation and sample of MDPE pipe, it was expected that the MDPE pipe would displace
vertically around 225 mm away from its original position.Fig. 13. Leak size on the NPS 8.
Fig. 14. Damaged asbestos pipe (water pipe).
Asbestos Pipe 
NPS8 Pipe 
PE Pipe 
0 mm 
225 mm 
Displacement Direction 
Original position at 0 mm 
Fig. 15. Schematic of PE pipeline displacement.
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The results for the simulation of water pipe leak are given in the picture sequence shown in Figs. 16 and 17. The possible
sequence of events is as follow:
i. Failure started as a small crack, possibly longitudinal in direction. The simulation was initiated when the crack size has
an effective diameter of 1.5 mm. The ﬂow trajectories of the jet are shown in Figs. 16a and 17a.
ii. As the effective diameter increased to 3.0 mm, it was shown that the force of the jet impacting on the steel pipe sur-
face was getting much more signiﬁcant (Figs. 16b and 17b). It was strongly believed that the water/slurry were strong
enough to cause coating losses on the steel pipe surface.
iii. The ﬂow trajectory was also shown to move along the upper surface of the steel pipe. This fact supports the ﬁnding of
the metallurgical study which shows a faster thinning process took place on the upper part of the pipe (Fig. 10c). This
phenomenon totally agreed with the study conducted on cylindrical specimen using slurry pot erosion tester as shown
in Fig. 18 [11].
iv. The simulation results seem to agree with the observed conditions of the pipe surface conditions as shown in Figs. 4b
and 6a.Fig. 16. Result of water jet simulation (2D velocity proﬁle).
Fig. 17. Result of water jet simulation (3D velocity proﬁle).
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The results for the simulation of the NPS8 pipe leak in term of pressure and velocity contour are given in the picture se-
quence as in Fig. 19a and b, respectively.
The following are the discussion of the probable cause and events that may had occurred as the MDPE pipe moves down-
wards (Fig. 15) due to the displacement and loss of supporting underneath materials, brought about by the continuous water
and natural gas jetting streams.
Locating around 0 mm, 25 mm, 50 mm, 75 mm and 100 mm of subsequent vertical displacement, pressure contours
showed that the pressure behaviour was not affected by the downward movement of the MDPE pipe, while the velocity con-
tours show no signiﬁcant differences. Jet ﬂow from the leaked steel pipe tends to ﬂow and diffuse as expected.
As the MDPE pipe further displaced to around 125 mm, it was clearly noticed that the pressure ﬂow tends to change its
direction. This was due to the direct perturbation of existing MDPE pipe close to regimes causing external aerodynamic
obstruction. The upper side of the jet ﬂow tends to move slower relative to the bottom side. Vorticity ﬂow will further de-
velop due to the differences of velocity difference between this opposite sides (Fig. 20).
This may have resulted due to different media contact phenomenon that contribute to external shear force created at the
upper side of the jetting regions and gravitational forces that may also appears to this regime. After certain distance, it was
noticeable that the ﬂow directions diverge upward due to apparent physical obstruction by MDPE pipe and natural gas lower
speciﬁc gravity.
As the MDPE pipe dropped vertically around 150 mm, the gas jetting direction directly hit the MDPE pipe, thus start to
shear by the high impact high pressure gas jet ﬂow. The pressure at this stage was around 1.7 bars with its ﬂow velocity
around 400 m s1. Fig. 17 indicated that the MDPE pipe may had experienced rapid failures.6.1.4. Summary of CFD study
The MDPE pipe failed mainly because of its severe physical surrounding conditions. Based on thorough technical speci-
ﬁcation evaluation, physical observations made during the study period and direct computational simulation results it can
be summarised that:
i. Water pipe leakages tends to ﬂow continuously towards the steel pipe and causing shearing phenomenon to the steel
pipe surface which directly contributed to the steel pipe failure.
ii. Results obtained indicate that, as the MDPE pipe vertical displacement does not exceed 100 mm, no signiﬁcant effect
to ﬂow condition towards MDPE pipe surface due to water high speed ﬂow.
iii. As the MDPE pipe lowered to 150 mm, signiﬁcant contact between gas jet and the MDPE pipe external surface
occurred and hence its surface would be directly subjected to shearing action of impacting ﬂow.Fig. 18. Schematic diagram of slurry ﬂow and distribution of deformation wear and cutting wear on a ductile material.
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In this particular part of study, the NASTRAN software had been used to simulate and evaluate stresses around the
steel pipe body especially in the vicinity of the failure region as the pipe thickness reduces due to the corrosion/erosion
effect. The study was performed by means of 3D and 2D structural simulation. The 3D failure study was conducted with
an aim to identify and locating the maximum stress and maximum displacement at nominated punch area. The 2D
structural simulation on the other hand will lead to a better understanding of the effect of pipe thickness reduction
due to pipe erosion at failed area. It could also indicate the minimum wall thickness prior to structural rupture based
on pipe wall strength analysis. Finally the pipe cross-section thickness mapping was studied to describe the thinning
process that took place on the pipe outer surface. The thickness reduction occurs from the external corrosion/erosion
effect could also be looked into.6.2.1. Structural geometry
In order to provide better understanding of the real system modeling, the modeled geometry must actually resemble the
real condition. Geometry for the pipe has been developed using 3D CAD (computer aided design) modeling, applying the fol-
lowing similarity factor:Fig. 19. Gas ﬂow pressure and velocity contours for the API 5L pipe leak. (a) Gas pressure contours for the API 5L X42 pipe leak. (b) Gas ﬂow velocity
contours for the API 5L pipe leak.
V1 
V2 
Upper side 
Bottom side 
V1 < V2
Vorticity 
Fig. 20. Vorticity ﬂow development.
Fig. 19 (continued)
832 Z.A. Majid et al. / Engineering Failure Analysis 17 (2010) 818–837i. Calculation conducted only to a portion of the NPS8 pipe domain of the modeled structure in order to reduce the
meshing and analysis complexity. The pipe length used is 1000 mm (exceeding 20 pipe size diameter, >20D) where
the effect or reaction at each end can be directly neglected.
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iii. The thickness of the pipe under consideration was assumed similar at any location (i.e. NPS8 = 5.6 mm).6.2.2. FEA simulation results
Fig. 21 shows four samples of ﬁnite element simulation results obtained. Summary of results (Table 5) shows that as the
punch depth gets deeper, the critical pressure due to the surface thickness reduction will subsequently increased. The critical
element displacement also increased as the wall thickness is further reduced.6.2.3. Results and discussion on wall thickness reduction
In the simulation process, 1800 kPa (18 bar) internal pressure was applied from inside the pipe structure. Using pipe
thickness mapping, the pipe thickness is modeled and simulated for different cases. The pipe thickness dimension model
has been based on its initial size of 5.8 mm. The simulations were subsequently executed for every 1 mm reduction of pipe
thickness shown in Fig. 22.
Fig. 21 and Table 5 (3D analysis) represent pipe wall stress and displacement distribution, which indicate substantial
increment as wall thickness reduces. The thickness reduction then lead to pipe failure is indicated by proﬁle 7 (Fig. 22).
Results of 2D wall thickness reduction study are shown in Table 6, Figs. 23–25. It is clearly shown that the thickness
reduction is directly due to the erosion effect. From the wall thickness proﬁle, if the wall thickness is lower than 1.5 mm,
the strength of the wall pipe is becoming weaker and the minimum thickness prior to failure is 1.25 mm limit.Case 1:  Stress Profile Case 1:  Displacement Profile 
Punch Depth:  0 mm (Pipe in normal 
 operating condition) 
Punch Radius:   0 mm 
Internal pressure:  1.8 MPa 
Max displacement:  46.6X106 Pa 
Punch Depth:  0 mm (Pipe in normal 
 operating condition) 
Punch Radius:   mm 
Internal pressure:  1.8 MPa 
Max displacement: 0.0202 mm 
Case 2:  Stress Profile Case 2:  Displacement Profile 
Punch Depth:   2 mm 
Punch Radius:  1 mm 
Internal pressure:  1.8 MPa 
Max displacement: 47.4X106 Pa 
Punch Depth:   2 mm 
Punch Radius:  1 mm 
Internal pressure:  1.8 MPa 
Max displacement:  0.0206 mm 
Fig. 21. Stress proﬁle on API 5L X42 pipes.
Table 5
Summary of 3D simulation result.
Punch depth Pipe thickness (mm) Stress (MPa) Displacement (102 mm)
Normal 5.6 46.6 2.02
2 mm 3.6 47.4 2.06
Hole 0 46.9 2.00
Fig. 22. Steel pipe wall proﬁle.
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Our study suggests that the asbestos water pipe with 10 mmwall thickness was the ﬁrst to fail. It probably started with a
small crack that could have produced the strong jetting effect that erodes rapidly the steel pipe. The ﬂowing water pressure
in the pipe was reported at around 1000 kPa (10 bar). The leak could have caused a high pressure water jet in which, with the
presence of the surrounding soil and sand materials, could have produced highly abrasive slurry. This slurry could have im-
pacted upon the NPS8, ﬁrst causing the erosion of the coating materials and then the thinning of the steel pipe body. After
sufﬁcient pipe material was removed, the remaining pipe strength will no longer able to withstand the high internal pipe
natural gas pressure. This eventually led to the steel pipe pinhole rupture and eventual enlargement, forcing more gas
out of the pipe.
Ideas stating that the steel pipe has developed the ﬁrst leak and caused the damage of the water pipe can easily be refuted.
Photo evidence (Fig. 26) from the repositioning of the pipes showed that the steel pipe leak position is not directly facing the
water pipe but rather towards the top. The opening of the water pipe is directly facing the eroded part of the steel pipe.
The high pressure jet of leaked water from the 600 (152.4 mm) water pipe had earlier caused the displacement of the sup-
porting soil materials underneath the MDPE causing it to move downwards. When the steel gas pipe leaked, more materials
was displaced causing the MDPE pipe to drop even further until it was low enough to be ‘in the line of ﬁre’ from the high
pressure gas jet. It was estimated that the MDPE pipe dropped some 200 mm from its original position.
7. Conclusions
In reference to the existing evidence deduced from the tests, simulation and substantial existing data the study revealed
that the root cause of the pipe failures is attributed to the initial leak of the asbestos water pipe. The pattern of the water pipeTable 6
Results on the pipe wall stress proﬁle.
Proﬁle Stress (Pa)
Max. stress (von misses) Permissible stress Different
1 4.38E + 06 9.30E + 07 8.86E + 07
2 4.87E + 06 9.30E + 07 8.81E + 07
3 7.63E + 06 9.30E + 07 8.54E + 07
4 1.14E + 07 9.30E + 07 8.16E + 07
5 1.76E + 07 9.30E + 07 7.54E + 07
6 3.26E + 07 9.30E + 07 6.04E + 07
7 1.31E + 08 9.30E + 07 3.80E + 07
Note: bold number shows that the pipe has already failed when the maximum stress exceed the permissible stress.
Fig. 23. Max stress and displacement results at pipe wall.
Z.A. Majid et al. / Engineering Failure Analysis 17 (2010) 818–837 835failure could not be determined due to the absence of damage specimen and the photo evidence at site only showed the state
of the pipe after excavation. However, from the basic pipe material properties and behaviour, it is suspected that the failure
was initiated by a crack, most probably longitudinal in nature. The crack or horizontal slit allowed high pressure water to jet
Fig. 24. Maximum stress.
Fig. 25. Maximum displacement.
Fig. 26. Relative positions of the 8 in. water pipe to the NPS 8.
836 Z.A. Majid et al. / Engineering Failure Analysis 17 (2010) 818–837through, with the jet momentum getting stronger as the effective diameter of the slit increasing. Over time the crack enlarge
and break off into large chunk or chunks, resulting in the gaping hole as evident in the photo record.
Initially, the water jet will mix with soil to form water slurry with high erosive properties. It impacted upon the pipe sur-
face causing the loss of pipe coating materials. Corrosion quickly ensued and material loss was rapid because of the contin-
uous erosion of oxidised material that occurred simultaneously. This phenomenon explains the rapid thinning of the steel
pipe body which later led to its failure. The possibility of material defect on the NPS8 can be ruled out as clearly indicated
by evidence from the metallurgical study especially on the photomicrograph. The morphology of the steel material was
Z.A. Majid et al. / Engineering Failure Analysis 17 (2010) 818–837 837consistent and did not show any evidence of micro fractures. Simulation results from both the CFD and structural study
strongly support the stated hypotheses.
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